# Issue & Incident Log **Purpose.** The record of what went wrong, what you did, and what changed as a result. It is both a management tool and the evidence base for serious-incident reporting duties. **When to use it.** From day one. You need the route defined before the first incident, not during it. **How to use it.** Define severity and the reporting clock in advance, and make reporting easy and blameless. The failure mode is not a bad log — it is people not reporting at all because they fear the consequences. --- ### Severity | Severity | Definition | Response | Notify | |---|---|---|---| | **S1 Critical** | Harm to people, regulatory breach, or major data loss | Immediate; incident lead appointed | Committee **immediately**; Board; regulator assessment within {{default:serious-incident-assessment}} | | **S2 Major** | Material impact; significant risk | Within 4 hours | Committee within 24 hours | | **S3 Moderate** | Contained impact | Within [1 working day] | Governance Lead | | **S4 Minor** | Negligible | Next cycle | Logged only | > **The serious-incident clock** > Under Art. 73 the reporting window for serious incidents is short and > starts when you establish the link between the system and the incident — > not when you finish investigating. Assess reportability **early and in > parallel** with fixing it. ### The log | ID | Date | Title | System | Severity | Type | Reported by | Owner | Personal data? | Reportable? | Status | Closed | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | INC-001 | [date] | Model returned biased ranking | AI-004 | S2 | Fairness | [name] | [name] | Yes | Under assessment | Open | | | INC-002 | [date] | Confidential doc pasted into public LLM | — | S2 | Data leak | [name] | [name] | Yes | Yes — DPA | Closed | [date] | ### Incident types Fairness / bias · Accuracy or drift · Data leak · Unauthorised use · Security (injection, poisoning, extraction) · Availability · Transparency failure · Oversight failure · Third-party / vendor · Regulatory ### Record for each incident 1. **What happened** — factual, no blame. 2. **When** — occurred, detected, reported. The gap between occurred and detected is itself a finding. 3. **Impact** — who and what was affected, how many people. 4. **Immediate action** — including whether the system was suspended. 5. **Root cause** — the real one, not the proximate one. 6. **Reportability assessment** — with the reasoning and the date decided. 7. **Remediation** — actions, owners, dates. 8. **Lessons** — what changed so it does not recur. ### Post-incident review For S1 and S2, hold a blameless review within {{default:post-incident-review-window}} Ask: - Could we have prevented it? Which control failed or was missing? - Could we have detected it sooner? - Did the escalation path work as written? - What changes in policy, control, or design follow? - **Does anything here change the Risk Register?** ### Trends Review quarterly for pattern: repeat causes, systems appearing often, and detection times getting longer. Report to committee via KPI / KRI Dashboard. --- ## Adaptation notes - **Small organisations:** Use your existing incident process and add the AI-specific fields — system, reportability, personal data. A separate AI process will not be remembered under pressure. - **Regulated sectors:** Map severity to your existing operational incident taxonomy and regulatory reporting triggers, so one incident does not get two incompatible severities. - **Consumer-facing services:** Add a customer communication field: what was said, by whom, and when. It is usually the part that gets scrutinised afterwards. --- *From the [Open Data & AI Governance Kit](https://lsdeva.github.io/governance-kit/). Licensed [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) — free to use, adapt, and share with attribution.* ***Not legal advice.** Adapt to your jurisdiction, sector, and risk appetite, and have qualified counsel review anything material.*